I derive practical formulas for optimal arrangements between sophisticated stock market investors (namely, continuous-time Kelly gamblers) and the brokers who lend them cash for leveraged bets on a high Sharpe asset (i.e. the market portfolio). Rather than, say, the broker posting a monopoly price for margin loans, the gambler agrees to use a greater quantity of margin debt than he otherwise would in exchange for an interest rate that is lower than the broker would otherwise post. The gambler thereby attains a higher asymptotic capital growth rate and the broker enjoys a greater rate of intermediation profit than would obtain under non-cooperation.
1 Introduction
Harry Markowitz' fundamental mean-variance theory (Markowitz 1952 ) of investment transforms the n-dimensional portfolio hyperplane into his trademark (twodimensional) mean-variance plane. Even better, the Markowitz bullet gives us a one-dimensional frontier of efficient portfolios that yield the greatest possible reward for any given level of risk. And given the freedom to borrow and lend cash, we need only focus on a single fund of risky assets that gives the greatest reward per unit of risk; the curvature of the Markowitz bullet is thereby replaced by the straightness of the capital market line. But the theory ends there; the practitioner receives no further prescription than to just borrow and buy as many shares of the tangency portfolio as is permitted by his particular appetite for risk.
This lack of guidance in one-dimensional gambling problems was acutely felt by card-counter Edward O. Thorp , who required an appropriate criterion for sizing his bets in certain favorable situations (Thorp 1966) that he found at the Nevada blackjack tables (cf. his 2017 autobiography). The correct answer ("Fortune's Formula,"
Poundstone 2010) is called the Kelly Criterion, after John Kelly (1956) , a physicist at Bell Labs. As was the custom in statistical communication theory, Kelly started with a simple example that turned out to be typical of the whole situation. He considered a long sequence of independent bets on horse races whereby the gambler knows the (stationary) win probabilities to more precision than the posted (even) odds. This illuminating environment led him to formulate the concept of a fixed-fraction betting scheme, whereby the gambler bets the same fraction of his wealth on each race. His famous criterion singles out the fixed-fraction betting scheme (or "Kelly bet") that generates the highest possible asymptotic per-bet capital growth rate. In blackjack, say, the Kelly fraction is b * = p − q, where p is the chance of winning the next hand A. Garivaltis and q is the chance of losing. For instance, if you have a p := 50.5% chance of winning the next hand, the criterion dictates that you should bet 1% of your net worth at even odds.
Kelly's theory extends easily to Black-Scholes (1973) markets whereby the asset price S t follows a geometric Brownian motion. In this environment, the gambler "bets" the fixed fraction b of his wealth on the stock over each differential time step [t, t+dt] . Apart from the fact that we now have a continuum of possible profit-and-loss outcomes
the correct behavior is governed by substantially the same logic (cf. Garivaltis 2018, Garivaltis 2019, and Ordentlich and Cover 1998), since the random fluctuations dW t := √ dt are identically (normally) distributed and independent across time.
It is well known (cf. Thorp 2006 ) that the Kelly bet for this market is
where ν := µ − σ 2 /2 is the expected geometric growth rate of the asset price and r is the interest rate at which the gambler can borrow and lend. If we take r := 2.44% (which is the 1-month U.S. treasury yield as of this writing) along with some stylized parameters (ν := 0.09, σ := 0.15) meant to represent the behavior of the S&P 500 index, we get b * = 3.42. That is, if the gambler himself had the opportunity to borrow at the risk-free rate, he would borrow $2.42 for every dollar of his own equity.
The author presently borrows from Interactive Brokers at a rate of 3.9% compounded annually, or 3.83% compounded continuously, which corresponds to b = 2.8. 
Contribution
Taking our inspiration from this broker-client relationship (which is both real and ongoing), we formulate and solve a Nash (1950) bargaining problem between a stock broker (that can borrow cash on the money market at the broker call rate, r) and a continuous time Kelly gambler to whom the broker issues margin loans at a markedup interest rate r L > r. The present situation for U.S. retail consumers of margin loans is just this: the broker posts a price r L (presumably a monopoly price), and the Kelly gambler (i.e. the author) responds by demanding the corresponding growthoptimal quantity q of margin loans per dollar of account equity. The corresponding
Kelly bet is then b := q + 1. These choices lead to a definite (logarithmic) capital growth rate of Γ for the gambler and a definite profit rate π for the broker.
Obviously, the principals should cooperate, if possible, and negotiate a margin loan contract (b * , r * L ) that jointly specifies the interest rate, the client's portfolio, and the quantity of margin loans to be issued over the differential time step [t, t+dt]. It would thereby be possible to convert the deadweight loss of monopoly into some agreed upon surplus values Γ * − Γ and π * − π. We show that, regardless of the disagreement point (π, Γ), the client will negotiate to bet as if he himself had the opportunity to borrow at the broker's cost of funds. We derive exact formulas for the efficient profit-growth frontier, the negotiated behavior (b * , r * L ), and the final utilities (π * , Γ * ) that obtain from Nash's cooperation scheme. We show that the efficient frontier is a straight line (whose slope is −1), and therefore our bargaining problem is one of transferable utility (cf. Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green 1995). We find that the Nash bargaining solution given here coincides with the Egalitarian solution, whereby all surplus value gained from cooperation is shared equally; the correct outcome (π * , Γ * ) on the profitgrowth frontier is found by intersecting it with a 45°line emanating from the threat point (π, Γ).
Definitions and Notation
As indicated above, we consider a Black-Scholes (1973) market with a single risk asset (i.e. the S&P 500 index) whose price S t follows the geometric Brownian motion
where µ is the annual drift rate, σ is the volatility, and W t is a standard Brownian motion. We consider a broker that makes margin loans at a continuously-compounded interest rate of r L per year, and whose cost of funds ("broker call rate") is denoted by r. The broker makes these loans to a continuous-time Kelly (1956) gambler (cf.
Luenberger 1998) whose behavior is characterized by the fact that he continuously maintains some fixed level b of exposure to the risk asset. That is, the gambler continuously maintains the fraction b of his wealth in the stock; if b > 1 then he continuously maintains a margin (debit) balance in the amount of b − 1 of his wealth.
For instance, if b := 1.5 then the gambler's margin loan balance would be continuously adjusted so as to constitute 50% of his wealth. We let V t (b) denote the gambler's wealth process, where V 0 is some given initial wealth. The (dollar) quantity of margin loans demanded is q :
We will assume that the client's objective is to maximize the almost-sure continuouslycompounded asymptotic growth rate of his capital, i.e. Γ := lim
As we will see presently (cf. Luenberger 1998), this is equivalent to maximizing the drift of log V t (b). The gambler's fortune evolves according to
Since the gambler's fortune follows a geometric Brownian motion, one can apply Itô's Lemma (cf. Wilmott 2001) to obtain the relation
or, equivalently,
Accordingly, the gambler's asymptotic growth rate will be denoted Γ(b, r L ):
Nash Bargaining
In what follows, we will assume that at every instant t, the broker and the Kelly gambler will Nash bargain (Nash 1950) over the margin loan arrangement (b, r L ), which simultaneously specifies the quantity of margin loans q = (b − 1)V t and the interest rate r L that will be charged by the broker over the differential time step
We let (π, Γ) := (π(b, r L ), Γ(b, r L )) denote the threat point, meaning that a breakdown in negotiations will lead to the broker charging r L and to the gambler betting the fraction b of his wealth on the stock over [t, t + dt]. Non-cooperation would thereby lead to a profit rate of π = π(b, r L ) for the broker and a growth rate of Γ = Γ(b, r L ) for the gambler.
Example 1. Rather than cooperate, the broker posts a take-it-or-leave-it price r L ≥ r, and the client chooses the corresponding Kelly bet (or log-optimal portfolio)
where we must assume that µ − σ 2 ≥ r L ≥ r in order to guarantee that the client will take a margin loan. This means that the risk asset must be sufficiently favorable (high drift and low volatility) in relation to the cost of funds, and also the interest rate r L must be sufficiently low that the client does not choose b = 1. The quantity of margin loans (per dollar of client equity) is
the broker's instantaneous rate of profit per unit time is
and, after simplification, the gambler's asymptotic capital growth rate is
Example 2. After a spiteful breakdown of negotiations, the broker does not even offer the client a margin loan (say, r L := ∞, or the client refuses to take a loan). Thus, the client just buys and holds the stock (b = 1, q = 0, π = 0), achieving an asymptotic
Naturally, a negotiated contract has the potential to make both parties better off: the client will agree to use more margin debt in exchange for a lower interest rate. The contract will be arranged just so; the gambler achieves a higher asymptotic growth rate on account of the lower r L and the broker achieves a higher rate of profit on account of the increased b.
The Nash (1950) product is equal to
and the Nash bargaining solution is equal to
Clearly, since π(•, •) is directly proportional to V t (b), we can normalize the gambler's wealth to $1 without any loss of generality. The negotiated behavior (b * , r * L )
is independent of the gambler's particular wealth level; it depends only on the GBM parameters (µ, σ), the broker's cost of funds r, and the threat point (π, Γ).
The first-order condition ∂N/∂r L = 0 simplifies to
e.g. the asymptotic growth rate that the gambler gains from cooperation must be equal to the rate of profit (per dollar of client equity) that the broker gains relative to the threat point. Taking the other first-order condition ∂N/∂b = 0 and using (16) to simplify, we get Theorem 1. Under Nash bargaining, regardless of the threat point, the Kelly gambler will bet the fraction
e.g. he will negotiate to bet as if he himself could borrow at the broker's call rate, r.
Substituting this value of b into (16), solving, and simplifying, we get Theorem 2. The negotiated interest rate under Nash bargaining is given by the for-
Example 3. Under total non-cooperation (π = 0 and Γ = µ − σ 2 /2), after factoring and simplifying, we get
where ν := µ − σ 2 /2 is the asymptotic growth rate of the asset price S t . The broker's rate of profit is
A. Garivaltis 
Utility Possibility Frontier
In this subsection, we derive the utility possibility frontier, e.g. we calculate the maximum possible growth rate Γ that is (cooperatively) achievable for a given profit rate π. Solving for r L in terms of π, we get
Substituting this expression into the formula for Γ, we get, after simplification,
Maximizing with respect to b, we obtain b * = (µ − r)/σ 2 . Substituting back into (23) and simplifying, we get the (linear) equation of the efficient growth-profit frontier:
Juxtaposing (23) with the egalitarian condition Γ − Γ = π − π, we obtain the fact that the final utilities under Nash bargaining are
and
(25)
Monopoly Threat Point
Remembering that we have normalized the gambler's fortune to $1, the broker faces the demand curve
The corresponding inverse demand (or marginal value) curve is r L (q) = (µ−σ 2 )−σ 2 q, and the marginal revenue curve is MR(q) = (µ − σ 2 ) − 2σ 2 q. The instantaneous price elasticity of demand for margin loans is
Equating the broker's marginal revenue to the marginal cost r of funding, we obtain the monopoly quantity
Substituting this quantity into the inverse demand curve, we get the familiar monopoly midpoint pricing rule:
That is, the monopoly price of margin loans is equal to the average of the choke point µ − σ 2 and the broker call rate r. Thus, under the monopoly threat point, the continuous-time Kelly gambler will bet the fraction
A. Garivaltis of wealth on the risk asset over [t, t + dt]. Given its net interest margin of r M − r = (µ − σ 2 − r)/2, the broker's instantaneous rate of intermediation profit per dollar of client equity is
and the gambler's asymptotic capital growth rate under the monopoly market structure is rate of deadweight loss (in the amount of 1.32% of account equity) has been converted to surplus value and shared equally between the counterparties: Γ−Γ = π−π = 0.66%.
This cooperative behavior is illustrated in Figure ( 2).
Several Risk Assets
In this section, we proceed to extend our main techniques and results to the general stock market with n correlated risk assets (i = 1, 2, ..., n) in geometric Brownian 
µ i is the drift of stock i, σ i is its volatility, and the (W it ) n i=1 are correlated unit Brownian motions. On that score, we let ρ ij := Corr(dW it , dW jt ), and we let
denote the covariance of instantaneous returns per unit time. In what follows, we will let µ := (µ 1 , ..., µ n ) denote the drift vector, and we will assume that the covariance matrix Σ := [σ ij ] n×n is invertible. In this generality, a continuously-rebalanced portfolio (or fixed-fraction betting scheme) is defined by a vector b := (b 1 , ..., b n ) ∈ R n of portfolio weights, where the intention is to continuously execute rebalancing trades so as to maintain the fixed fraction b i of wealth in stock i at all times. As usual, we let V t (b) denote the gambler's fortune at time t; the instantaneous quantity of margin loans demanded therefore amounts to
or just q = 1 b − 1 per dollar of client equity, where 1 := (1, ..., 1) is an n × 1 vector of ones. The broker's instantaneous rate of intermediation profit is now π = (1 b − 1)(r L − r) per dollar of client equity. The evolution of the gambler's fortune is now governed by the stochastic differential equation
Applying Itô's Lemma for several diffusion processes (cf. Wilmott 1998), we obtain the fact that
which, upon integration, yields
In this connection, the gambler's continuously-compounded asymptotic capital growth rate is now
Proceeding as before, the correct behavior is obtained by optimizing the Nash product
Using the product rule to calculate ∂N/∂r L , we obtain
Assuming interiority (1 b > 1), we cancel the common factor q = 1 b − 1 and again obtain the egalitarian condition Γ − Γ = π − π. Using the product rule to calculate the gradient ∇ b N of the Nash product with respect to b, we get the (vector) condition
Assuming that there are gains to be had from cooperation (meaning that π − π and Γ−Γ are both positive numbers), we cancel this common factor and simplify to obtain
As expected, this is precisely the behavior of a continuous time Kelly gambler (cf.
Luenberger 1998) who is permitted to borrow cash at the broker's call rate, r. Using this fact in conjunction with the egalitarian condition and the defining expressions for Γ and π one calculates the negotiated interest rate to be
which is in perfect accord with (18) .
Taking our cue from the univariate case, we can derive the (linear) efficient Γ − π frontier in just the same way. For a given rate π of intermediation profit, we solve for r L and obtain
.
Substituting this expression into the definition of Γ, one has, after simplification,
Maximizing b out of this expression, we obtain b * = Σ −1 (µ−r1); the general equation of the efficient frontier is
The final utility vector (Γ * , π * ) that obtains from Nash bargaining therefore lies at the intersection of the efficient frontier (49) and the line Γ = Γ−π +π which expresses the egalitarian division of surplus value. Solving these simultaneous equations, we
Monopoly Disagreement Point
If negotiations break down and the broker simply posts a price r L , then the gambler will react with the corresponding Kelly rule, namely, b(r L ) = Σ −1 (µ − r L 1). Thus, the broker faces the instantaneous demand curve
The instantaneous elasticity of demand for margin loans is therefore given by
The inverse demand (or marginal value) curve is
which induces the marginal revenue curve
Intersecting marginal revenue with marginal cost (which is MC(q) ≡ r), we get the monopoly quantity
Reading off the inverse demand curve, the monopoly interest rate is now
Exact formulas for all remaining quantities of interest, like the consumer surplus, the deadweight loss, and the profit and growth rates that would obtain under the monopoly threat point, all follow in the obvious way from the monopoly price and quantity given above, just as they did in the univariate case.
Conclusion
This paper studied negotiated margin loan contracts between continuous time Kelly All potential cooperation between these counterparties rests on the fact that the market admits assets (or continuously-rebalanced portfolios of said assets) whose asymptotic growth rate is significantly higher than the broker's call rate, r. The broker, who charges margin interest at a continuous rate of r L > r, seeks an arrangement whereby his instantaneous rate of intermediation profit, namely π := (1 b − 1)(r L − r)
per dollar of client equity, is as high as possible. The Kelly gambler, who is notoriously far sighted (cf. MacLean, Thorp, and Ziemba 2011), is willing to stomach any level of volatility, value-at-risk, or maximum drawdown in exchange for the highest possible asymptotic capital growth rate, here denoted Γ :
In an evolutionary sense, the broker must treat his Kelly gamblers with kid gloves, for they will hold asymptotically 100% of the equity on deposit, and (on account of their fixed leverage ratio) they will shoulder 100% of all margin debt in the limit.
If the broker and the Kelly gambler fail to come to terms (that would simultaneously specify the interest rate, the portfolio, and the quantity of margin loans), then there are two obvious ways the disagreement could play out. In the most spiteful scenario, the Kelly gambler borrows no cash at all (or the broker doesn't lend him any); the broker's intermediation profit is zero and the client makes do with optimizing his growth rate over the set of unlevered continuously-rebalanced portfolios (e.g. he is constrained by the condition 1 b = 1). The second possibility is the one that seems to actually obtain in this world: the broker just posts a monopoly price r M , and the gambler then demands the corresponding monopoly quantity q M of margin loans as dictated by his instantaneous demand curve.
Following Nash's (1950) theory of axiomatic bargaining, we maximized the Nash product N := (π −π)(Γ−Γ) over the profit-growth plane of points (π, Γ) ≥ (π, Γ); the factors of this product are the respective surplus values extracted by the counterparies from cooperation as opposed to disagreement, which only yields meager levels (π, Γ) of utility. We found that, regardless of the threat point (π, Γ), the gambler will negotiate to bet as if he himself could borrow money at the broker's (low) cost of funds. On account of the egalitarian (first-order) condition Γ − Γ = π − π, the surplus value from cooperation will in any event be divided evenly between the counterparties. We used this fact to derive exact formulas for the negotiated interest rate r * L and the final utilities (π * , Γ * ) that obtain from cooperation. Finally, we derived an expression for the efficient frontier in the profit-growth plane: it is a straight line (whose slope is −1), meaning that our particular bargaining problem enjoys the special property A. Garivaltis of transferable utility (cf. Myerson 1997) . Geometrically, the negotiated outcome (π * , Γ * ) is the result of intersecting the efficient frontier with a 45°line emanating from the threat point (π, Γ).
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